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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN E. MERRIHEW, ) 
) 
Plaintiff- Appellant, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING AND ) 
ZONING COMMISSION, LELAND S. ) 
SWANER, BUDD M. RICH, GARY D. ) 
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BOWEN, VELMA STEELE, WILLI.AM ) 
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) 
) 
Case No. 18070 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks the issuance of an extra-
ordinary Writ in the nature of mandamus under Rule 65B(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to require the defendants-respondents 
to reinstate and implement the decision of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County approving his Application for 
a zoning change. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of defendants-respondents after ruling that the case presented no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants-respondents 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff - appellant seeks on this appeal to have the 
Summary Judgment vacated and set aside and to have the case 
remanded to the District Court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County seeking the issuance of an Extraordinary Writ 
in the nature of Mandamus under the provisions of Rule 65B(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Those named as defendants included 
all serving members of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and 
the Zoning Administrator, Planning Director and Building Inspection 
Department Director of Salt Lake County. (R.20-29) 
The Complaint alleges that plaintiff filed his Application 
with the Salt Lake County Planning Commission for a zoning change 
on a small piece of agric u 1 t.ural land in Salt Lake County to enable 
him to construct a small one-story grocery and fruit store on the 
property. (R.20) That Application was denied on grounds that (1) 
the request was in conflict with the County Master Plan, (2) the 
proposed use was not necessary nor desirable at that location, and 
(3) the ingress and egress to the site was already dangerous. (R.26) 
The denial of the Application was appealed to the Board 
of County Connnissioners. (R.27) That body approved the Application 
and granted the zoning change, thereby reversing the previous decision 
of the Salt Lake Planning Commission. (R.29) 
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Plaintiff was granted a Building Permit and made 
arrangements to construct the store building on the newly-zoned 
premises. One day before the construction was to begin, plaintiff 
was advised by the defendants that his Building Permit had been 
revoked and that the approval of the zoning change had been with-
drawn by the Commission.. The reason given for the withdrawal was 
that the Planning Commission had learned that the legal description 
in the plaintiff's Zoning Application was not accurate. (R.22) 
The Complaint alleges further that the acts of the 
defendants in withdrawing the zoning change previously approved by 
the Board of County Commissioners exceeded the jurisdiction of the 
Planning Commission and abused its discretion. Plaintiff alleged 
that these actions were arbitrary and capricious in nature. (R.22) 
Based thereon, plaintiff sought mandamus relief from the court. (R.24). 
The Complaint alleges further that the Planning Commission 
was aware of the actual location of the property that was subject 
to the zoning change, and that the defendants willfully and inten-
tionally withheld the information about the erroneous property 
description from the plaintiff and from the Board of County Commis-
sioners until it would be impossible, because of notice requirements, 
to have the appeal re-heard by the Board of County Commissioners as 
then constituted. Both o.f the Salt Lake County Commissioners who 
voted in favor of the zoning change were leaving office on January 1, 
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1981, and were being replaced by newly elected officials who were 
not previously involved in granting the zoning change. The only 
incumbent County Commissioner had voted against that change. Plain-
tiff alleged tha-t the defendants were attempting to circumvent the 
previous decision of the Board of County Commissioners in that 
manner, all of which was contrary to law·and in derogation of the 
constitutional and legal rights of the plaintiff .. (R. 22) 
Based on the Verified Complaint of the plaintiff, the 
court entered its Order to Show Cause requiring the defendants to 
certify to the court a Transcript of the records and proceedings 
of the administrative body pertaining to plaintiff's Application 
for zoning change. (R.23) This has never been done, but the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office filed-an Answer alleging that the 
legal description set forth in the Notice of the Zoning Hearing 
held before the Board of County Commissioners does not accurately 
describe the plaintiff's property, is confusing and misleading, 
and does not inform interested parties as to the property which 
was considered for rezoning. The Answer questions, because of 
defective notice, the enacting of the zoning ordinance which allowed 
the zoning change by the Board of County Connnissioners. The Answer 
expressly admits that plaintiff is the owner of certain real 
property located at approximately 7770 South 2000 East in Salt Lake 
County. (R.34-37) 
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Defendants subsequently filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the·ground that there were no material facts in dispute 
in this action and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. (R.68) The Motion was supported by affidavits of 
some of the defendants, which established that the legal descrip-
tions furnished by the plaintiff were erroneous, a fact which is 
not disputed in this action. (R.56-67) The affidavit of Roy S. 
Baty, Jr., states that the street address of 7770 South 2000 East 
has been given to another person known as Edson Packer. (R.62) 
The plaintiff countered with his own Affidavit in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.83-91) This 
Affidavit states that the property to be rezoned is located at 
approximately 7770 South 2000 East. Mr. Merrihew pointed out that 
he resides at 7750 South 2000 East and his father resides at 7790 
South 2000 East. The vacant property to be rezoned lies between 
the residences of the plaintiff and his father, and is located at 
approximately 7770 South 2000 East. (R.83-84) Again, the Answer 
admits that plaintiff is the owner of that property. (R.34) 
The plaintiff also points out in his Affidavit that 
Mr. Edson Packer actually resides on a private roadway at least 
1/2 mile west of 2000 East. Mr. Merrihew also points out that 
Mr. Packer has no interest in the property to be rezoned and has no 
interest in any land located at approximately 7770 South 2000 East. 
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The address used in the Application was chosen for the purpose 
of accurately showing the true location of the property rather 
than to give the property a street address. (R.85) 
Mro Merrihew also points out that he has requested a 
similar zoning change on the same piece of property on at least two 
previous occasions. The members of the Salt Lake County Planning 
and Zoning Commission visited the premises prior to the hearing on 
each of those previous applications. Both the Planning Commission 
and the Salt Lake County Board of commissioners visited the property 
in connection with the present Application for zoning change. (R.85) 
Mr. Merrihew also points out that none of the defendants 
ever raised any question about the location of the property until 
the 'discovery' of the erroneous property description, and that 
submission of the erroneous property description did not mislead 
or misdirect the Salt Lake County Commission or the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners in their consideration for the zoning change.~, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was argued before 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on September 16, 1981. (R.92) After 
hearing argument of counsel, the Judge granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and remanded the matter to the County Commission. (R.92) 
Formal judgment was entered by the court on September 23, 1981, dis-
missing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice and declaring the 
zoning enacted by the Board of County Commissioners to be null and 
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void. 'The judgment_ said nothing aho.ut the defense of failure to 
exhaust a dministra.tive remedies, and the court apparently di.d not 
base its judgment on that defense. (R. 94) 
- This appeal was timely filed on October 16,· .1981. Plain-
tiff contends on this appeal that the 'pleadings and affidavits on 
file with the ·court raise mater.ial questions of fact to be ·resolved 
by the ·court at trial, and that defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment should have beeri deriied. (R. 9 6) 
. ARGUMENT· 
POINT. NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
BECAUSE. THERE.WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT 
TO BE DECIDED BY A TRI.AL OF THIS ACTION 
WHEN THE.CASE WAS CONCLUDED BY THE COURT. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the 
circumstances under which the court may enter Summary Judgment in 
a pending legal action. The applicable language reads as follows: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depos.itions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." 
In construing and applying this Rule, the Utah Supreme 
Court has carefully def±tied :·and limited the circumstances under 
which Sunnnary Judgment is appropriate. In the recent case of 
Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, the Utah court 
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pointed out that Sunnnary Judgment can only be granted when there is 
no dispute as to a material fact. The language of the court elabor-
ating on this principle is as follows: 
"It is a well-settled principle of law that sunnnary judgment 
can only be granted when there is no dispute as to a material 
fact. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 
P.2d 1274 (1973); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 
17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966). The purpose of summary judgment is to save the expense and time of the parties and 
the court, and if the party being ruled against could not 
prevail when the facts are looked at most favorably for his 
position, then summary judgment should be granted. Holbrook 
Co .. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975). If there is a 
question of fact raised by the pleadings or affidavits, the 
court is precluded from granting summary judgment. Hatch v. 
Sugarhouse·Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 768 (1967)." 
In W. M. Barnes Company v. Ohio Natural Resources Company, 
627 P.2d 56, the court pointed out that the district court has no 
right to weight disputed evidence or determine the credibility of 
witnesses in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In this regard, 
the court stated as follows: 
"On a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate 
for a.court to weigh disputed evidence concerning such 
factors; the sole inquiry to be determined is whether 
there is a material issue of fact to be decided. Holbrook 
Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975). In making that 
determination, a court should not evaluate the credibility 
of the witness. It is of no moment that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling, and 
documentary evidence is not dispositive if the intent and 
purpose underlying the documents are at issue. Kjar v~ 
Brimley, supra."(27 U.2d 411, 497 P.2d 23) 
In the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, which to 
is cited extensively in most later cases dealing with sunnnary judgment, '.o 
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the court emphasized the importance of allowing issues of fact to 
be decided by the jury. We quote from the decision as follows: 
" ..• it only takes·one sworn statement under oath to 
dispute the averments on the other side of the contro-
versy and create an issue of fact. This is analogous to 
the elemental rule that the fact trier may believe one 
witness as against many, or many against one. 
* * ·* * * * It is not the purpose of the summary judgment pro-
cedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither 
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the 
time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken 
of the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he 
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears, 
is the court justified in refusing such a party the oppor-
tunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade 
the ·fact trier to his views. Conversely, if there is any 
dispute as to any issue, material to the settlement of the 
controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted." 
The Utah case of Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 
40, 368 P.2d 266, points out that the court must view the pleadings, 
evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the loser, and that the record must preclude, as a matter of law, 
all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given a trialo 
Applying the tests laid down by this court in the above 
cases, it appears that the District Judge was in error when he granted 
Sunnnary Judgment in favor of the defendants in this action. The plead-
ings and affidavits on file herein raised questions of fact pertaining 
to whether the public and the Commissioners were aware of the accurate 
location of the property and whether they were mislead or confused by 
the inaccurate legal description. There were other factual questions 
about the arbitrary and capricious nature of the action taken by 
defendants· and about whether defendants intentionally violated the 
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constitutional and legal rights of the plaintiff. 
A. Location of property. 
Although plaintiff has conceded that the legal description 
on the Application for zoning change was not accurate in all respects, 
he has not thereby suggested or agreed that the Application did not 
adequately describe the property for interested persons or that the 
Application mislead or confused interested parties as to its actual 
location. The Application states that the property is located at 
7770 South 2000 East in Salt Lake County.. (Ro84) This piece of 
property is well known to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. 
Mr. Merrihew has requested a similar zoning change on the same piece 
of property on at least two previous occasions. Those previous 
applications were denied, but in each instance the members of the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission visited the premises to make 
an on-site inspection of the property prior to the hearing held on 
the application. In connection with the present applicatio.n, the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and the Salt Lake County Board 
of Commissioners both visited the property described in the Applica-
tion before their separate rulings were made on the zoning change. 
Until the 'discovery' of the erroneous property description, none 
of the defendants in this action ever raised any question about the 
location of the property. Attached to the Merrihew Affidavit as 
Exhibit B, is a map that was prepared by the Salt Lake County Planning , 
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Commission in connection with plaintiff's Application for Zoning 
Change.(R.88) The circled area of that map shows the exact location 
of the property which plaintiff asked to have rezoned. That Exhibit 
was prepared by the planning staff, and we can presume that they 
knew the location of the property which they so accurately outlined 
on their· map. (R.85-86) 
In an effort to show their confusion as to the location of 
the property, the defendants filed the Affidavit of Roy S. Baty, Jr., 
who points out that the address on the Application of 7770 South 2000 
East was given to property owned by Edson Packer on June 7, 1972. 
On the other hand, Mr •. Merrihew states in his Affidvait that he re-
sides in a home at 7750 South 2000 East while his father resides at 
7790 South 2000 East. The property between the two homes is vacant 
land that is owned by the plaintiff. Its approximate location is 
7770 South 2000 East. That address was used in the Application 
because it most nearly described the street address of the proposed 
store building. (R.85-86) 
The conflicting affidavits of Roy S. Baty, Jr. and John E. 
Merrihew raise issues of fact regarding whether the Board knew the 
precise location of the rezoned property and whether adjoining land 
owners were confused or mislead by the erroneous legal description. 
Neither the Utah statutes nor the Salt Lake County Zoning 
Ordinances specify the form of the notice to be published and given 
to the public in connection with appeals made to the Board of County 
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Commissioners on zoning matters. The Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County, 1966, §22-1-2, specifies the appeal procedures. It 
provides that any person shall have the right to repeal from any 
decision rendered by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission by 
filing an appeal in writing within 10 days after the decision with 
the Board of County Connnissioners. The ordinance provides further 
that the Board of County Commissioners may set a date for a public 
hearing, notice of which will be published in a newspaper of general 
circulation within the county at least 30 days prior to the hearing. 
In the case of Naylor v •. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah l 
2d 300 ,. 410 P. 2d 764, the Utah Supreme Court held that the notice 
of a zoning ordinance was proper and adequate even though the notice 
incorrectly stated the reclassification that was desired. The notice 
advised that the proposed change was from R-6 to C-3, while the 
zoning was actually changed from R-6 to B-3. Plaintiffs claimed 
that since the notice was erroneous, the zoning change was void. 
This court noted that the plaintiffs had suffered no disadvantage 
because they had had actual notice of the change made and had parti-
cipated in the hearings before the Board of County Commissioners. 
Utah law in this regard is similar to cases decided in 
other states. In Capps v. City of Raleigh, 241 SE.2d 527, 531, the 
North Carolina court held that sin~e the zoning ordinance in question 1 
did not require a metes and bounds description, then a general notice 1 
designating the area to be affected by the zoning change was suffi-
cient to put property owners in the vicinity on notice that their 
property may be rezoned. 
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In Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, the 
court laid down a test for the sufficiency of notice to be given in 
zoning cases. The plaintiff contended that the notice to neighbor-
ing landowners was .insufficient because it did not describe the 
land by metes and bounds~ The court stated that the notice in zon-
ing cases must be sufficient to inform the ordinary layman lacking 
experience in zoning matters of the property affected and the changes 
sought. A metes and bounds description is not needed to satisfy 
this test. Significant here was the fact that notice was mailed to 
all adjoining landowners having property within 200 feet of the 
zoned property. 
The courts of Florida held an ordinance valid despite the 
fact that the description of the property affected by it was differ-
ent from the property described in the notice pursuant to which it 
was passed. See Bregar v. Britton,75 So.2d 753, Cert Den 348 US 972, 
99 L.Ed 757, 75 S.Ct. 534. 
In Closterman v. Cranford Township, 22 NJ Super 204, 91 
A.2d 646, the New Jersey court affirmed a judgment upholding the 
validity of a zoning ordinance even though the legal description 
was inaccurate. The court noted that the monumenting in the notice 
was sufficient, since the street lines of the property constituted 
monuments and correctly delineated the property. The court found 
no irregularities in the notice of the ordinance and said the 
purpose of the statutory notice is to give citizens notice of the 
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consideration of the ordinance and an opportunity to be heard. 
Since the facts showed that citizens appeared in substantial num-
bers at the hearing, then the purposes o~ the statute had been 
served. See also Helms v. Charlotte, 255 NC 647, 122 SE.2d 814, 
96 ALR2d 439. 
In Ciaffone v. Community Shopping Corporation, 195 VA. 41, 
77 SEo2d 817, 39 ALR2d 757, the Virginia court rejected the conten-
tion that a zoning ordinance was invalid because notice of the 
exact property to be affected by it had not been published in 
accordance with the state enabling statute where the trial judge 
had found that the property was described with reasonable certainty 
and sufficient definiteness to be identified. See also 2525 East 
Avenue Inc. v-. Brighton, 33 MISC 2d 1029, 228 NYS2d 209, 17 APP 
DIV 2d 908, 233 NYS2d 759. 
In Carson v. Board of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 NE2d 116, 
the Massachusetts court held that notice of hearing on a petition 
for a special permit for the erection and maintenance of a garage 
was adequate even though the street adress stated therein was 
erroneous. It appeared that the subject property had once been 
part of a large tract which fronted on Bedford Street and that the 
entire tract was numbered 47-49 Bedford Street. Prior to the filing 
of the petition for the special permit, the owner had sold off the 
portion fronting on Bedford Street, leaving the property to be 
rezoned fronting on Camellia Place, which ran easterly from Bedford 
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Street. The court said the notice was sufficient even though the 
land did not front on Bedford Street because the remaining land was 
still being taxed as if it were located at 47-49 Bedford Street. 
The court said the description in the petition and notice could 
hardly have ref erred to any land other than that for which the 
special permit was requested, since the only other land having the 
same numbering was the land whcih had already been conveyed to the 
town. The court also noted that since no one objected to the wrong 
description at the hearing before the board, then no one could have 
been mislead by the description. 
The case of Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 U.2d 310, 437 
P.2d 442, seems to establish the Utah test for determining the 
sufficiency of notice to the public in zoning cases. In expressing 
its feelings about the notice requirements, the Utah court quoted 
from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 US 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 
94 L.Ed. 365, as follows: 
11The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the 
opportunity to be heard. * * * 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 
* * * A notice must be of such nature as reasonabl~ to 
convey the required information * * *and it must a ford 
reasonable time to those interested to make their a ear-
ance. Emp asis y t e court. 
The above cases show that a flawless metes and bounds 
description of the property to be rezoned is not necessary so long 
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as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain that the 
subject property may be affected by the enactment. In the case now 
before the court, the Salt Lake Planning Commission was fully aware 
of where the property was located. Its members had actual notice 
of the precise spot where Mr. Merrihew wanted to build the store. 
Many property owners in the immediate vicinity had participated in 
the hearings held before the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County. The erroneous legal description caused them no inconvenience 
or loss whatsoever. Defendants didn't even discover the erroneous 
property description until after the hearings had been held and the 
decision had been rendered. The fact that there were some errors 
in the legal description did not void the notice given to the public 
or nullify the proceedings in which the zoning was changed. 
One obvious legal principle appears from reading the many 
cases cited above. There is no way to determine whether the given 
notice of a proposed zoning change is adequate or proper without first 
hearing the facts and circumstances relating thereto. The contradic-
tory information found in the pleadings and affidavits in this case 
did not give the court sufficient factual basis upon which to rule 
on the issues as a matter of law. 
B. Arbitrary and capricious action of the defendantso 
A second question of fact remained to be decided by the 
trial court before entry of judgment wa3 proper. Plaintiff's Complaint i 
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alleges that defendants willfully and intentionally withheld the 
information about the erroneous property description from him and 
from the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County until 
November 25, 1980, so he could not, because of statutory notice 
requirements, have his appeal reheard by the Board of County Commis-
sioners as then constituted. The two County Commissioners who 
voted in favor of the zoning change were scheduled to leave office 
on January 1, 1981. Through the election process, they had been 
replaced by newly elected officials who were not previously involved 
in granting the zoning changeo ·The sole remaining incumbent County 
Commissioner had voted against the change. Plaintiff alleged that 
the acts of the defendants in attempting to circumvent the previous 
decision of the Board of County Commissioners were arbitrary and 
capricious and were in derogation of the constitutional and legal 
rights of the plaintiff. 
The affidavits of the parteis do not address themselves 
to this issue. There is no way to determine whether plaintiff's 
allegations of arbitrary and capricious action are true without 
hearing facts presented by the parties at the trial of this case. 
In the case of Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 16 U.2d 192, 
392 P.2d 27, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a Summary Judgment 
entered in a zoning case. The plaintiff had alleged an abuse of 
discretion and arbitrary action on the part of the Salt Lake Ci'ty 
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Commission fn,changing the zoning classification of certain real 
property. This court held that plaintiffs, by their Complaint and 
by their offer of proof, presented genuine issues to be resolved by 
the court at the trial. Upon a second appeal of the same case after 
trial, Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 U.2d 277, 410 P.2d 
764, the court held that the evidence at trial supported defendant's 
claim that the City Commissioners were not guilty of an abuse of 
discretion. The combination of these two appeals indicates that the 
questions of arbitrary and capricious actions are to be determined 
from the facts of the case presented at trial. 
POINT NO. II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO EXHAUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING 
THIS ACTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Based upon the c.ase of Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company, 
392 P~2d 40, 15 U.2d 305, the defendants claimed in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administra-
tive remedies before filing suit in the District Court. The cited 
case was factually different from the instant case. In the Lund 
case, the court held that plaintiff had not exhausted his administra-
tive remedies because he had failed to appeal a decision of the 
Planning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners, as required 
by the applicable ordinance. The court held that an adverse decision 
of the Planning Commission must first be appealed to the higher admin-
istrative tribunal before a suit can be filed to contest that decision. 
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The facts of the Lund case are much different than the 
ones now facing the court. Plaintiff in this action first went 
before the Salt Lake County Planning Commission with his Application 
for a zoning change. When that change was denied, the decision of 
the Planning Commission was appealed to the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County and was reversed. No appeal was taken from 
that decision. After the decision was final, the employees of the 
Planning Commission set it aside without hearing or review because 
of alleged notice deficiencies. Having taken such administrative 
action, the defendants now claim that plaintiff must return to the 
Board of County Commissioners and appeal the decision of the 
bureaucrat before plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
The law of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not 
even apply to this case. The very purpose of Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is to provide relief from arbitrary and capricious 
administration actions such as the one referred to herein. The rule 
provides for. a cause of action separate and apart from any available 
administrative remedies. 
Since it does not appear from the record that the court 
based its Summary Judgment on defendants' claim that plaintiff has 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff will 
not elaborate further on this point unless requested to do so by 
the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For reasons stated herein, the court should reverse the 
decision of the District Judge and remand the matter to the District· 
Court for trial. 
DATED this~ay of January, 1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
w~~~ 1LRALPH t«4EMM 
Attorney ror Appellant 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing by having two copies thereof delivered 
to counsel for the defendants-respondents, Kent S. Lewis, 151 East 
2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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